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The efficiency gains from improving resource allocation in China's agriculture have been dramatic. Lin (1987) found that a shift from the cooperative farming system to the household farming system resulted in a 19.7% productivity jump (from 1980 to 1983). Fan estimated that 63% of the productivity increase (at an average of 2.13% per year, 1965-85) can be attributed to efficiency improvement, resulting from institutional changes. Central to this transformation toward free markets in Chinese agriculture is the behavior of the rural household. The experience of economic reform since the late 1970s is a lesson on how important the rural household's efficiency performance is to China's agricultural economy. Under the rural household responsibility system, the basic production unit shifted from collectivized farms to rural households. Other reforms allowed for the sale of commodities to private parties, and the free flow of surplus rural labor to local industries and urban areas. The agricultural sector responded to these reforms with increased production of most major commodities due to productivity gains. Lin (1992) found that the productivity change resulting from various reforms made up 42.23% of the output growth during 1978-84, and no increasing trend in technological change was detected. However, in this unfolding process of agricultural reform, the relationship between market indicators, household characteristics, and production efficiency has not been well understood. A better understanding of this relationship should aid policy makers in creating efficiency-enhancing policies and in judging the efficacy of past reforms. These relationships also interest policy makers in other nations where government plays a major role in traditional agriculture.
Production efficiency is usually analyzed by separately examining its two components: technical and allocative efficiency. Measures of technical efficiency are usually derived from statistically estimated production (cost) function or programming model estimates of best versus average or individual farmer's output (cost), while allocative efficiency is examined by comparing the marginal products of factors with their normalized prices. Recent developments in the literature combine both measures, technical and allocative efficiency, into one system. This approach enables more efficient estimates to be obtained by simultaneously estimating the system (e.g., Kalirajan, Kumbhakar 1989 ). However, the previous research on Chinese agriculture (post-1978) productivity has focused on total factor productivity, while the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency were rarely examined. ' Stochastic frontier functions are most commonly used in studying production efficiency. The early literature on stochastic frontier functions (e.g., Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt) assumed the existence of data on a single crosssection of firms, and the separation of technical efficiency from random noise required assumptions about their distribution. Schmidt Yotopoulos, Lau, and Kutlu argue that a production function approach may not be appropriate when estimating the production efficiency of individual farms because farmers may face different prices and have different factor endowments. An attempt to incorporate the farmlevel prices and input use into estimation of production efficiency led to the profit function formulation, and the early development of profit function models does not provide a numerical measure of efficiency for each individual farm (e.g., Yotopoulos 1971, 1979 ). Ali and Flinn directly estimated farmspecific efficiency from a variable-coefficient profit frontier function using market prices. In general, the use of standard dual representations of the production structure requires the corresponding maintained hypothesis of cost minimization or profit maximization, subject to parametric market prices. Thus, in the case of regulated industries or imperfect markets, as in China, this hypothesis may be invalid.
A new aspect in the use of the profit function is the so-called behavioral profit function approach. This generalized profit function incorporates price distortions resulting from imperfect market conditions, and sociopolitical and institutional constraints. These restrictions cause the "prices" (shadow prices, unobserved by economists) that farmers actually pay (or receive) to differ from the observed market prices. Kumbhakar and Bhattacharyya developed a generalized profit function to test the appropriateness of a neoclassical profit function and the effect of education and farm size on allocative performance. Shui, Wailes, and Cramer used a shadow profit function to investigate resource use efficiency in Chinese agriculture. These models, however, do not provide a numerical measure of profit efficiency for each farm. A more recent study conducted by Ali, Parikh, and Shah estimates Pakistan farms' production efficiency by using both stochastic frontier and behavioral profit functions separately. Their rejection of the market efficiency hypothesis from behavioral function analysis, however, indicates that the stochastic frontier function, based on market prices, is subject to misspecification because farmers' profit maximization decisions were based on shadow prices rather than on market prices. Consequently, the decomposition of the profit efficiency index, based on market prices, may be misleading. Very few post-1978 Chinese agriculture efficiency studies employ the dual approach, and none of them incorporate market distortions.
The objective of this study is to develop an estimation process that incorporates price distortions but retains the advantages of stochastic frontier properties. This framework is applied to measure the profit efficiency of Chinese farm households. First, the farmers' shadow profit and shadow prices, which farmers base their decisions upon, are derived through a behavioral profit function. Then a shadow-price stochastic frontier profit function, using the predicted shadow profit and shadow prices obtained from the behavioral profit function estimates, is estimated and the efficiency index is derived and related to households' demographic variables.
Most productivity studies on China's post-reform agriculture-for example, Lin (1987 Lin ( , 1992 
Price Distortions in Chinese Agricultural Markets
In China, as in most countries, agricultural policies and regulations are implemented by intervening in both input and output markets. Although the economic reform in China has greatly reduced direct government control over production and marketing, government intervention remains in agriculture through various means. By 1990, for example, the state used contract purchases and "negotiated prices" purchases to intervene in the output market. State contracts called for the purchase of a specified quantity of output at a price fixed below the market price. To purchase output beyond the contracted amount, the state used "negotiated prices," a mechanism based on open market prices. Since open market sales from farmers accounted for less than 10% of total grain sales in 1990, the state acted like a monopsony and determined grain prices to a large degree. In the agricultural input markets, government-owned businesses have delivered farm inputs, such as chemical fertilizers and diesel fuel, to producers for many years. The government has often used input subsidies to induce cooperation from farmers. Major input subsidies tied to contract procurement in 1990 included advance payments of up to 20% of contracted value, and guaranteed amounts of fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, and plastic sheeting at low subsidized prices (USDA 1991). 2 Other sociopolitical and institutional constraints faced by Chinese farmers also cause market distortions. For instance, there are always supply shortages of major material inputs, such as fertilizer. Some farmers may be able to obtain an adequate supply of fertilizer at the state distribution price because of their personal relationship with state agencies, while others may have to pay a premium over that price. Village leaders and/or families with nonfarm workers may have special privileges, such as access to credit or cash paid for their sales to the state purchasing organizations, while others are forced to accept the state's use of promissory notes (IOU) instead of cash payments.3 In many cases, local government levies special fees related to procurement and input supply. In such situations, the actual prices received and paid by farmers differ from market observations because of nonprice restrictions.
Modeling Price Distortions and ShadowPrice Profit Frontier
Given the existence of binding constraints on decision making, as revealed by a number of studies (e.g., Atkinson and Halvorsen; Toda; Kumbhakar'and Bhattacharyya), the producer's decision is often made with respect to shadow prices rather than observed market prices. Therefore, the farmer's optimum decision is allocatively efficient, with respect to market prices, only when the market prices reflect the opportunity cost of inputs and outputs and the farmer does not make systematic mistakes in decision making.4 The divergence between shadow and observed prices can be interpreted as the result of imperfect markets, government interventions, and various restrictions. The divergence provides a measurement of market distortion.
One commonly used approach to model the wedge (caused by market distortions) between the two prices, based on Lau and Yotopoulos (1971), is to define a relationship between the normalized shadow price, ps(ws for input), and the normalized market price, p(w), as p = 8jpj and ws = 0iwi where 8j and 0i are (nonnegative) price efficiency parameters. These O's capture the effects of exogenous constraints faced by farmers, as well as allocative inefficiency.
This study combines the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency in the profit relationship. Within a profit function context, following Ali and Flinn, profit efficiency is defined as the capability of a farm to achieve the highest possible profit, given the prices and levels of fixed factors. The advantage of using the dual approach is that price variables are treated as exogenous, and consequently, even if a single equation is used, there is no inconsistency (Kumbhakar and Bhattacharyya). The profit function approach allows the incorporation of farm-specific prices and fixed factors The price efficiency parameters, 8j and 08, are latent variables. They are assumed to be farmspecific in order to reflect an individual household's price response to market distortions. Since one of our objectives is to examine whether education and relative resource endowment have any influences on price response to market distortions, we model O's as follows for each input and output price: Based on the behavioral profit function described above, the next step is to construct a stochastic shadow-profit frontier function. The estimated 08's from the first step are used to derive the shadow prices (0jpj, 8iwi), and to predict shadow profit (In ,t*) by using the estimated second term on the right-hand side of equation (6). The predicted shadow profit In 7t, is then given as 6 Given the scarcity of farm land relative to labor and the substantial variations of farm household's labor-to-land ratio across the nation in traditional Chinese agriculture, it is widely believed that the labor-to-land ratio is highly correlated with some socioeconomic conditions, and partially determines farm characteristics, such as off-farm employment, credit availability, machinery use, and the farmer's economic performance. Initially, a number of household characteristics were used as explanatory variables in equation (7). Simple statistics show that labor-to-land ratio (T) is correlated with farm size, off-farm employment, credit, and machinery spending. After those variables which correlated to T were dropped, coefficients for T and education level, ED, were found to be significant. survey records all major production and consumption activities of rural households during the year.
The subsample used in this study is randomly selected from the national sample. Households having no farm land or labor or having negative profit are excluded. For the analysis in this study, 1889 observations are used. Two output prices of crops and livestock, two variable input prices of chemical fertilizer and other purchased materials (including fuel, seeds, plastic sheets, pesticides, etc.), and three fixed inputs of labor (no hired labor was recorded), land, and capital are constructed from the survey data set.
The survey contains no price variables. All price variables (unit value) for individual commodities and input factors are imputed using quantity, revenue, and expenditure variables. When imputation is not possible (i.e., the household did not produce or purchase a specific commodity or input factor), the missing prices are set according to the average for the province where the household is located. China's rapid economic reform in agricultural sector during the 1980s resulted in a mixed government-controlled and free-market economy. By 1990, nationwide fixed prices no longer existed for most agricultural products and input factors. Thus, each price used in the study is a simple average of transactions made during the year through different market channels. Price indices for the two outputs and two variable inputs are constructed by using the Divisia index: where In ph is the price index for the jth aggregate for the hth household; rij is the share of the ith item in the jth aggregate for the hth household; In ph is the price of the ith item in the jth aggregate for the hth household; -, In p,1 are the averages of the shares and logprices for all households in the sample. The base for these indices is the average of the sample. Therefore, these indices have an average value of zero. Through the above aggregation, all households in the sample produced the two outputs and used the two variable inputs. In a cross-section sample, price differences arise for various reasons, such as the relative distance from markets and from input distribution centers, monopoly power of processors or input suppliers, and regional and seasonal differences. This study focuses on the effects of exogenous market imperfections and restrictions. In this case, farmers are still price-takers. These factors do not invalidate the use of the profit function approach.7
For the nonland capital inputs, the service flow from the stock of capital is assumed to be proportional to the stock. Consequently, a certain percentage of the stock value can be used as a proxy for the service flow. Land is taken as the total area of cultivated land, including both contracted areas and private plots. The labor variable is defined as the total number of maleequivalents engaged in agricultural production. Family members employed in rural industries and other nonfarm businesses are excluded from the farm labor force. These fixed inputs are expressed in index form with the average of the sample used as a base. For the variables FS and ED in equation (8), four dummy variables, SF (small farm), LF (large farm), LE (low education), and HE (high education), are constructed to distinguish relative farm size and the household labor's education level. The household demographic variables selected are family size, per capita net income level, whether the household has any family member operating as a village leader or employed by the government or state industries, the household's geographic location, and whether the household is a minority.8
Profit, defined as the value of outputs minus the costs of variable inputs, is the return on fixed factors. The profit used for the first step estimation (In nta) is constructed through total revenue and total variable cost by using each commodity produced and factors used in production multiplied by the market prices, while the second step estimation (In tnp) uses the predicted shadow profit computed from equation (9).
In the first step estimation, the behavioral profit function is estimated by expanding equation (6) with In r*, s;, and si derived from equation (1). All O's are replaced as shown by equation (7). Also, equation (8) The estimated farm-specific price efficiency parameters for crops (01), livestock (02), and chemicals (0c) are computed for all observations. On average, 01 takes the value of 0.69 with 93.4% of the individual values less than one. The mean for 02 is found to be 0.85, and 97.4% of the individual values were less than one. These results indicate that the "prices" farmers actually received were less than observed market prices for their crops and livestock products because of restrictions. On the input side, the mean of the farmer's shadow purchase price for chemical fertilizer is 7% higher than market price based on a mean for the estimated 0, of 1.07 with 55% of the individual values greater than one. 9 To save some space, full expansion of equation (6) and estimates of the county dummy variables are not reported. Based on the t-statistics, 54% of the county dummy coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 significance level for both behavioral and frontier profit estimations. The derivation of the equation and the statistical results can be obtained from the authors. 10 Lopez shows that empirically the most flexible functional forms do not satisfy the properties of global monotonicity and convexity. Calculation of farm-specific profit efficiencies facilitates decomposition of the efficiency index to identify the factors influencing profit efficiencies. Table 4 contains the estimates of the truncated efficiency decomposition regression. The results show that family size and per capita net income are positively related to profit efficiency. Minority households and households in mountain areas are relatively inefficient. Households with family members employed by the government or state industries are also inefficient, while households with members operating as village leaders tend to be more efficient. A negative relationship is found between profit efficiency and coastal region households. Although this result conflicts with conventional wisdom, the relative scarcity of farm land and higher population density in coastal areas may force farmers to overuse inputs, thus causing lower profit efficiency.
Summary and Conclusion
This study examines Chinese farm household's production efficiency. Given a mixed government-controlled and free-market economy, the observed prices used in the analysis are an average of government-controlled prices, semicontrolled prices, and free-market prices. Furthermore, prices that farmers actually pay (receive) are different from observed prices because of some market restrictions other than direct government control. The prices that farmers actually paid (received) are not directly observed. Since profit-maximizing producers' production decisions are based on prices they actually pay (receive), farm households' profit " In generating variable In Wa, the observed market prices were used for valuing the household's decision variables of outputs and variable inputs which were made based on shadow prices. Consequently, In Ia does not necessarily reflect the household's objective. Therefore, technical efficiency estimates should be interpreted cautiously. show that specification of profit maximization based on market prices is inappropriate. Thus, the shadow-price profit frontier function (rather than market-price profit frontier function) is estimated and the efficiency index is decomposed. The profit efficiencies range from 0.013 to 0.93 with 24.2% of the rural households' efficiency levels being less than 0.50. The profit efficiency decomposition results and the findings from the behavioral profit function estimation indicate that higher education, larger farm and family size, and higher per capita net income are significant variables for increasing profit efficiency. Small family size households and families with members who are government or state industry employees tend to have lower profit efficiency. These results suggest that increasing farm size (scale) and allowing relatively scarce resources (e.g., farm land) to transfer among households will improve production efficiency. Consequently, improving efficiency of resource use requires development of a land market or a well-behaved land use rights transfer system as a complement to the 12 Under the original land contract system, land is equally distributed to households on a per capita basis. Currently, there is not a well-defined land market in China. Sales of farmland are very rare. However, the right of land use can be transferred in accordance with the law that was approved on 12 April 1988, and farmers have found a way to transfer land use rights through village committees and township governments that manage the land contract system (USDA 1993; Zhang and Makeham).
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land contract system.12 The findings of the relationship between efficiency and farm's geographical location also suggest that improving efficiency is not only a task for "developing regions," such as the mountainous, northwestern, and minority areas, but also for "developed regions" such as the coastal areas. Policy makers need to better understand the significance of low allocative efficiency like that found in coastal areas. All previous studies on Chinese agricultural productivity indicated that institutional changes from 1978 to 1984 led to substantial improvement in production efficiency. With the full implementation of the household responsibility system nationwide in 1983-84, the slowdown in productivity growth shifted the focus of development toward technical changes. This study shows that a considerable potential productivity can be gained by continuously improving efficiencies. Both technical and allocative efficiencies can be improved by reducing market distortions, allowing land use rights to transfer more freely, enhancing the farmers' accessibility to education, and providing a social-economic environment that helps farmers to increase their net income.
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